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  In the assessment and review of regulatory reforms in the electric power market, 
price elasticity is one of the most important parameters that characterize the market. 
However, price elasticity has seldom been estimated in Japan; instead, it has been merely 
assumed to be as small as 0.1 or 0 without examining the empirical validity of such a priori 
assumptions. We estimated the regional power demand functions for nine regions in order to 
quantify the elasticity, and found the short-run price elasticity to be 0.100–0.300 and the 
long-run price elasticity to be 0.126–0.552. Inter-regional comparison of our estimation 
results suggests that price elasticity in rural regions is larger than that in urban regions. 
Popular assumptions of small elasticity such as 0.1 could be suitable for examining Japan’s 
aggregate power demand but not the power demand functions that focus on the respective 
regions. Furthermore, assumptions with smaller elasticity values such as 0.01 and 0 could 
not be supported statistically. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1  Motivation for the Empirical Analysis of Power Demand in Japan 
  The electric power industry is an industry that requires large-scale supply facilities 
in order to provide its services. It involves huge fixed costs, while the variable costs are 
small. This feature makes this industry a natural monopoly sector. Authorities regulate the 
rates of return of power companies and impose obligations of universal service on them. At 
the same time, they permit power companies to act as monopolistic service providers within 
their jurisdictions. These regulatory measures are effective and efficient only when the 
economies of scale are significantly large and information on the power companies’ true 
costs is available to the authorities for charge regulations. However, these assumptions are 
not always consistent with reality. For example, the technological progress in recent years 
has improved the efficiency of small-scale thermal power plants, which were previously less 
competitive than large-scale ones. That is, economies of scale have been decreasing in the 
power generation sector. Moreover, the regulatory authorities cannot obtain complete 
information on the true cost structures of power companies as it is considered to be private 
information. Poor charge regulations and a lack of (potential) competitive pressures lead to 
inefficient resource allocation, such as a so-called X-inefficiency and overcapitalization found 
by Averch and Johnson (1962). 
  In the 1990s, European countries and several states in the US had initiated Page 3 
regulatory reforms to reduce the inefficiency caused by monopolies. These reforms were 
designed to promote competition in order to improve the efficiency of resource allocation 
through the market mechanism rather than the use of direct and indirect controls by the 
authorities. In liberalized markets, players, particularly incumbents, attempt to exploit the 
monopolistic power they are endowed with as their legacy from the old regime; hence, we 
require a deeper understanding of the market for effective surveillance. In Europe and the 
U.S., theoretical insights and empirical findings about their markets were available and 
supported their reforms. 
  The recent “lost decade” after the bubble burst compelled the Japanese government 
to implement structural reforms through deregulation in order to facilitate a recovery from 
the severe recession. As part of the structural reform package, various regulatory reforms 
have been implemented in the power market, which had long been regionally monopolized. 
The power market reforms were, however, mostly planned on the basis of research and 
conclusions drawn from countries other than Japan. Such conclusions might be informative; 
however, they could be irrelevant for Japan. It is essential to empirically understand the 
various features of Japan’s power market. In particular, in quantitative assessments of 
reforms, there are some critical parameters such as the price elasticity of power demand. 
While it is widely recognized that the results of assessments are significantly sensitive to Page 4 
assumptions about such a key parameter, quantitative analyses on Japan’s power market 
have often employed a priori assumptions of 0.1 or 0 for the price elasticity of power demand. 
    There have been several empirical analyses on Japan’s power market in connection 
with the recent power market reforms. Kanemoto et al. (2006, Ch. 5) and Tanaka (2007) 
simulated cases in which incumbents exercise their market power in order to rig the market 
at a peak hour in summer. They assumed the price elasticity of demand to be 0.1 in an a 
priori manner. In contrast, Hattori (2003) conducted a similar analysis; however, he 
assumed a wide range for price elasticity—0.1 to 1.0. He chose to conduct this type of 
sensitivity analysis due to the scarcity of literature on the price elasticity of power demand 
in Japan. 
 
1.2 Literature  Survey 
  Although there are many empirical analyses on the power demand in Europe and 
the US, they mostly deal with residential demand and aim to examine whether deregulation 
has benefited both large-scale users and small-scale ones, particularly residential users. 
  In Japan, in 2000, deregulation in the retail sector was introduced in the market 
segment of large-scale users of extra-high-voltage power services—mainly factories and 
office buildings. In recent years, the scope of deregulation has been gradually enlarged to Page 5 
cover smaller-scale users of high-voltage power services. In 2007, however, the authorities 
decided to suspend further enlargement of the reform scope to small-scale users, including 
residential ones, considering the disappointing outcome of the recent regulatory reforms. 
This was because the market shares of the entrants were too small (about 2%) to have 
significant impacts on the market. Therefore, it is important for the current policy 
discussions to understand the power demand of industrial and commercial users rather than 
that of residential users. 
  Our review of the analyses of industrial and commercial power demand revealed 
only a small amount of research on the topic (Table 1). For example, as Taylor (1975) 
surveyed, Anderson (1971) and Mount et al. (1973) analyzed industrial and commercial 
power demand and found small elasticity close to the a priori assumption1. Later, Pindyck 
(1979) also conducted a similar analysis. Using the recent time series dataset for the US, 
Hisnanick and Kyer (1995) found the price elasticity of power demand at 0.185, while 
Kamerschen and Porter (2004) found it between 0.34 and 0.55. These findings suggest that 
the price elasticity of power demand in Japan is obviously larger than the common a priori 
                                                       
1 Fisher and Kaysen (1962) also estimated industrial demand using cross-sectional state data for the 
US in 1956. Page 6 
assumptions. 
  In the case of Japan, Pindyck (1979) estimated the energy cost functions in 10 
countries using time series data. In Pindyck’s study, electric power demand was considered 
as one of the energy inputs, and the price elasticity of power demand was found to be 0.12. 
Using regional data for Japan, Matsukawa et al. (1993) estimated the price elasticity of the 
power demand of the manufacturing sector. They assumed translog energy composite 
demand functions with four energy inputs (oil, gas, coal, and electricity). They estimated the 
energy cost share functions using the pooled data from 1980 to 1988 for nine regions in 
Japan (i.e., all the jurisdictions except Okinawa). They found the price elasticity of power 
demand to be 0.632. The Cabinet Office (2001), (2007) estimated the demand functions of 
total electric power (including residential as well as industrial and commercial ones) for 
Japan, excluding Okinawa, and found the price elasticity to be 0.441 for the period 
1981–1998 and 0.373 for the period 1986–20053. 
  Estimating the price elasticity of power demand by using nationwide or pooled data 
                                                       
2  Matsukawa et al. (1993) also estimated residential demand and found the price elasticity to be 0.37. 
3 However, it should be noted that these two estimates were derived assuming different functional 
forms for power demand functions. Page 7 
implies a presumption that all the regional power demand functions are identical and 
dependent on various exogenous factors in the same magnitude. However, vertically 
integrated regional power companies in Japan have a developed, self-sufficing power system, 
where the domestic load is almost fully met with domestic power supply in each jurisdiction 
even after deregulation. Based on company size, the Tokyo Electric Power Company 
(TEPCO) is the world’s largest power company in terms of the volume of power supply; 
however, other regional power companies in Hokkaido, Hokuriku, and Shikoku are only 
one-tenth the size of TEPCO. Moreover, the demand structure can differ significantly by 
region due to climate conditions, as Japan comprises several islands that are spread over a 
long stretch from north to south. Therefore, we have to pay attention to the unique features 
of regional power markets rather than applying the same model to all the regional power 
markets in Japan. In this study, we estimated the power demand for each regional power 
market. Our results revealed some implications about the validity of the typical a priori 
assumptions on price elasticity. 
 
2.  Model and Data 
  There are 10 jurisdictions assigned to the same number of vertically integrated 
regional power companies in Japan. From among these 10 jurisdictions, in our study, we 
analyzed the power demand in nine regions (Hokkaido, Tohoku, Tokyo, Chubu, Hokuriku, Page 8 
Kansai, Chugoku, Shikoku, and Kyushu). The regional electric power demand function was 
specified as follows: 
  () () ( ) ( ) 1 , , , , log log log log − ⋅ + ⋅ ′ + ⋅ + = t i i t i i t i i i t i Q p Q δ β α X λ ,   (1) 
where  t i Q ,   denotes the power demand index in region i in year t;  t i p ,  denotes  the  average 
power charges; and  t i, X  denotes the other explanatory variables4. We introduced gross 
regional products ( t i GRP, ) in order to control the impacts of the regional economic activity 
level, and introduced cooling degree days ( t i Cool , ) and heating degree days ( t i Heat , ) in 
order to control the impacts of climate conditions on power demand. A producer price index 
of petroleum products ( t Ppet ) was employed as a typical substitute for electricity in energy 
demand.  t D   denotes a dummy variable for deregulation in the retail sector starting in 2000. 
A lagged dependent variable ( 1 , − t i Q ) was employed to consider a dynamic adjustment 
process with a Koyck-lag formulation. Given this functional form, we can obtain the 
short-run price elasticity  i β  and long-run price elasticity  ( ) i i δ β − 1 , which are constant 
through time. Values and prices were deflated using a domestic corporate goods price index. 
  These data were obtained from the database (Denryoku-tokei-joho) provided on the 
                                                       
4 In this study, we focus on the sum of industrial and commercial power demand—that is, the power 
demand excluding that of residential users. Page 9 
Web site of the Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan (FEPC), the Annual Report 
on Prefectural Accounts, and the Handbook of Energy and Economic Statistics in Japan. For 
our estimation, we used these annual data for 28 years, from fiscal years 1976 to 2003. 
Details of these data are summarized in the Appendix. 
 
3. Estimation 
3.1  Estimation Results of Regional Power Demand Functions 
  We estimated the regional power demand function (1) using the ordinal least 
squares (OLS) method (Table 2). The coefficients of power charges (i.e., short-run price 
elasticity) were found to be significant and negative in all the regions; this was qualitatively 
consistent with our intuition. The ranges of the estimated price elasticity of power demand 
were between 0.100 (Kansai) and 0.300 (Shikoku) in the short run and between 0.126 
(Kansai) and 0.552 (Hokkaido) in the long run. As a whole, the magnitude of these estimates 
was found to be similar to that in the previous studies summarized in Table 1. 
  On comparing the estimates among regions, the price elasticities of demand were 
found to be relatively low in the Tokyo, Chubu, and Kansai regions, where many large cities 
are located. Industrial and commercial users, which were analyzed in this study, are mostly 
large-scale users, and some of them are equipped with their own power plants. Electricity 
purchased from regional power companies is highly substitutable with electricity generated Page 10 
by the plants owned by large-scale users. As the share of power supplied by their own plants 
increases, the power demand function can be observed to become more price elastic. Other 
than facility costs, there were many region-specific cost factors and constraints for the 
installation and operation of self-owned power plants, such as environmental regulations 
and the availability of plant sites. Rural regions provide a better environment for such a 
purpose; hence, their power demand is more price elastic than that of urban regions. This 
finding was consistent with another finding that the coefficients of the petroleum products 
price index in rural regions were greater than those in urban regions. Although it would 
have been ideal for us to explicitly consider these factors as explanatory variables in our 
model, the availability of data was limited. The capacities of self-owned power plants and 
their share in the total regional power supply capacity were introduced as additional 
explanatory variables; however, they were not found to be significant. This may be because 
these capacity variables did not successfully function as good proxy variables of the volume 
of power generated for self-consumption. 
  With regard to coefficients other than those of price elasticity, the coefficients of 
gross regional products were generally found to be 0.3–0.4 among the different regions. This 
result implied that this explanatory variable effectively controlled the impacts of regional 
economy sizes on power demand. The coefficients of the cooling degree days were not Page 11 
statistically significant in Chugoku and Shikoku, while those of the heating degree days 
were not significant in Hokkaido and Shikoku. Except for these cases, the coefficients of 
variables controlling the climate conditions were found to be significant and positive as 
expected. The insignificance of the coefficient of heating degree days in Hokkaido could be 
attributed to the fact that its energy demand for heating is heavily dependent on kerosene, 
rather than electricity. 
  The coefficients of the dummy variables for deregulation in the retail supply of 
electric power were found to be significant and negative in all the regions, except Chubu. 
This implies that users had shifted their demand from services provided by the incumbents 
to those provided by entrants. However, we should exercise some reservation in accepting 
this interpretation. The users were supposed to have chosen power service providers after 
comparing the offers made by incumbents with those by entrants; however, in our 
estimation, we did not consider the details and differences of their offers. More detailed 
modeling will be needed when we intend to exactly evaluate the impacts of such factors. 
  We found the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable to be significant, 
positive, and smaller than unity for all the regions. These findings were consistent with a 
standard assumption for partial adjustment models. The impact of the lagged dependent 
variable 
s
i δˆ  on the power demand s years ago became less than 5% in four years for all Page 12 
nine regions. This suggests a time horizon for our “long-run” estimates. 
 
3.2  Discussions about the Price Elasticity of Regional Power Demand 
  Experts in the power market have considered power demand to be very inelastic. 
Based on such a view, numerical simulation analyses have often employed a small price 
elasticity, such as 0.1 or 0; however, the validity of such assumptions has never been 
examined empirically. Technologically speaking, the power industry is unique in the sense 
that electricity cannot be stored but has to be delivered to users on time. As power 
companies are required to accurately meet the constantly fluctuating demand, it might be 
practical for power companies to conduct their daily operations assuming that power 
demand hardly responds to any incentive schemes that power companies may offer. Such an 
a priori assumption of price-inelastic power demand might be reasonable for discussions 
about very short-run situations in the power network largely governed by 
electrotechnological laws and constraints. In contrast, such an assumption might not be 
valid for policy discussions about regulatory reforms for the coming several years, when 
economic incentives are supposed to urge players in the power market to achieve better 
resource allocation. Using our estimation results, we discuss the validity of such a priori 
assumptions. Page 13 
  Figure 1 shows the point estimates and their 95% confidence intervals of price 
elasticity. There are three regions with relatively small price elasticity. In Tokyo and Kansai, 
it is highly probable (about 50%) for the price elasticity to be less than 0.1. There is a 14% 
probability for the price elasticity to be less than 0.1 in Chubu. In the other six regions, such 
a probability is found to be negligibly small and the highest probability, 0.6%, is found in 
Hokuriku. With these findings, we can conclude that there should be some justification for 
us to assume 0.1 as the price elasticity of the total power demand in Japan, since the three 
largest regions—Tokyo, Chubu, and Kansai—account for around two-thirds of the total 
power demand in Japan. In fact, as the 95% confidence intervals of the weighted average of 
short-run price elasticity were 0.077–0.251, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that this 
price elasticity is less than 0.1 at the 95% significance level5. 
  In contrast, our estimation results of regional power demand functions did not 
support the assumption of 0.1 as the price elasticity of power demand in regions other than 
Tokyo, Chubu, and Kansai. Such an assumption of small price elasticity can mislead the 
analysis of regional power markets, particularly when the differences among regions have 
                                                       
5  The average price elasticity was computed at the sample means using regional power demand as the 
weight. Page 14 
significance. We found much weaker support for a smaller price elasticity such as 0.01. The 
probability of the price elasticity being less than 0.01 was highest (3%) in the case of Kansai. 
The t-statistics of the coefficients of power charges in Table 2 indicated no significant 
probability for the price elasticity to be zero. 
 
4. Conclusion 
  Discussions and debates over regulatory reforms for the power market in Japan 
have often been based on the findings of research on the power markets in Europe and the 
US, or on conclusions drawn from them. Since these studies were conducted on reforms in 
Europe and the US, their implications might not be valid for the situations in Japan. Indeed, 
it is ideal for us to employ views on the unique features of Japan’s power market in 
discussions about its future reforms; however, to date, only a few studies are available on 
this topic. Even price elasticity of power demand, one of the key parameters characterizing 
the market, has rarely been estimated empirically. Instead, it has often been assumed to be 
a small value such as 0.1 in an ad hoc manner. 
  In our study, we econometrically estimated the regional electric power demand 
functions and derived the price elasticities. Price elasticity was found to be 0.100–0.300 for 
the short-run power demand functions and 0.126–0.552 for the long-run functions; power 
demand was found to be relatively more price elastic in the rural areas than in the urban Page 15 
areas. This result suggests that (1) there is some validity in an a priori assumption of 0.1 for 
the price elasticity of power demand in analyses of the nationwide market in Japan but not 
in analyses focusing on the characteristics of regional power markets, and that (2) there is 
little empirical support for a price elasticity of 0.01 or 0. It should be noted that while our 
findings were derived using an annual dataset, price elasticity can be found in a different 
magnitude using a dataset for another market setup, such as an hourly power market in 
peak load times, which was analyzed by some previous literature referred to in 1.1. In this 
sense, it is necessary to exercise some caution in accepting our findings and their 
implications. 
  Statistical examinations did not indicate any specification errors even without 
considering supply-side factors explicitly. This may be partly due to the sample period in our 
analysis, when power charges had long been regulated in almost all the sample years, except 
for the last few years when regulatory reforms were implemented in the retail sector. We 
attempted to control the shocks caused by the reforms using a dummy variable; however, we 
did not seriously consider the endogeneity of explanatory variables in our model. When the 
reforms are widespread and have created intense competition in the power market, we need 
to conduct a simultaneous estimation of power demand and supply functions. Moreover, our 
analysis, which focused on power demand by industrial and commercial users, can be Page 16 
extended to an analysis of power demand by residential users. Page 17 
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Table 1: Estimates of the Price Elasticity of Power Demand 
 Country  Type  of  users  Data 
Estimates of 
price elasticity
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Table 2:  Estimation Results (Dependent Variable: Index of the Volume of Power Demand) 


















Adjusted R2 Durbin’s h
1.08981 –0.29650 0.37040 0.19822 0.00852 0.01361 –0.05291 0.46303 0.994 0.191
Hokkaido 
[.048] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.005] [.832] [.003] [.000] [.849]
0.15965 –0.26583 0.41314 0.15366 0.00907 0.13215 –0.04222 0.44448 0.996 –0.781
Tohoku 
[.649] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.098] [.012] [.012] [.000] [.435]
0.13118 –0.10503 0.39612 0.06903 0.04826 0.07053 –0.02488 0.44674 0.999 0.267
Tokyo 
[.447] [.003] [.000] [.005] [.000] [.005] [.021] [.000] [.790]
0.75692 –0.15385 0.37949 0.07743 0.04649 0.05172 –0.02123 0.39633 0.996 –0.189
Chubu 
[.021] [.005] [.000] [.022] [.002] [.068] [.183] [.001] [.850]
1.64525 –0.25447 0.34335 0.07470 0.02512 0.10417 –0.03626 0.28431 0.986 –1.117
Hokuriku 
[.003] [.000] [.000] [.025] [.012] [.028] [.051] [.020] [.264]
0.64188 –0.10001 0.48696 0.11808 0.06296 0.04253 –0.03736 0.20813 0.996 –0.227
Kansai 
[.008] [.041] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.048] [.004] [.089] [.820]
0.95591 –0.26410 0.29245 0.16015 0.02364 0.06738 –0.05177 0.47152 0.985 –1.389
Chugoku 
[.025] [.000] [.000] [.001] [.160] [.092] [.022] [.000] [.165]
1.64683 –0.30033 0.33273 0.22593 0.03047 0.04951 –0.04421 0.26978 0.980 0.292
Shikoku 
[.003] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.117] [.266] [.038] [.056] [.770]
0.68918 –0.22854 0.47181 0.13176 0.02583 0.04767 –0.04323 0.37057 0.996 0.402
Kyushu 
[.008] [.000] [.000] [.003] [.045] [.071] [.013] [.002] [.688]
Note: P-values are shown in brackets. Page 23 



















Confidence interval (Long run)
Confidence interval (Short run)
Point estimates
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Appendix: Data Sources and Compilation 
  Details and the sources of data used in our estimation are summarized in Table A.1. We 
obtained the data on regional power demand from Denryoku-tokei-joho [Statistical database of the 
power market] provided on the Web site of the FEPC. The regional power demand of industrial 
and commercial users was computed by subtracting the demand of residential users from the total 
regional power demand. With regard to our data compilation process, some may assume that it 
would have been more straightforward to use the sum of commercial and large- and small-scale 
industrial power demand as the data in our analysis. However, user categories in the original time 
series data were rearranged each time deregulation was implemented in the retail sector and its 
coverage was expanded. Thus, we could not use such a method in our data compilation. The power 
charges used in our estimation were the average charges for users defined above, which were 
computed by dividing the charge revenues by the volume of power demand. 
  Gross regional products were originally reported for 47 prefectures. We have aggregated 
these data for nine jurisdictions of the power companies (Table A.2). Shizuoka prefecture is served 
by two power companies due to historical reasons. The western and central areas are served by the 
Chubu Electric Power Company, while the eastern area is by served by TEPCO. We compiled the 
data on Shizuoka assuming that one-third of its gross regional product is attributed to Tokyo, and 
the rest to Chubu. This assumption was based on the fact that the shares of these two service 
areas in Shizuoka are almost 1:2 in terms of power demand, population, and the number of 
business establishments. Page 25 
  The cooling degree days and heating degree days are reported in the Handbook of Energy 
and Economic Statistics in Japan, where 22 ºC and 14 ºC are used as the bases of the heating and 
cooling degree days. We used these data for cities where the power company’s headquarters are 
located. They are used to control power demand mainly for air-conditioning purposes. Further, the 
value of cooling degree days in some years was zero. As this would have caused a problem in the 
computation of their logarithms in our log-linear model, we redefined the cooling degree days 
variable by adding one. We deflated all prices and values using the domestic corporate goods price 
index [all commodities] provided by the Bank of Japan. Page 26 
Table A.1: Data and Data Sources 
Data Unit  2/ Source 
Electric power demand  Index  Compiled by the authors 
Total electricity sales   
Total lighting services 
1,000 kWh 
FEPC, Denryoku-tokei-joho 
[Statistical database of the power 
market] 
Average power charges  Index  Compiled by the authors 
Power service revenue  Million yen  FEPC, ibid. 
Deregulation dummy  2000–2003 = 1  Compiled by the authors 
Gross regional products  Index  Compiled by the authors 1/ 
Gross prefectural products  Million yen 
Cabinet Office, Government of 
Japan, Annual Report on 
Prefectural Accounts 
Domestic corporate goods price index 
[petroleum products] 
Domestic corporate goods price index [all 
commodities] 
Index Bank  of  Japan 
Cooling degree days 
Heating degree days 
Degree days 
Energy Data and Modeling 
Center, Institute of Energy 
Economics, Japan, Handbook of 
Energy and Economic Statistics 
in Japan 
1/  See Table A.2 for regional aggregation. 
2/  Indexes: 1995 = 100. 
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Hokkaido Hokkaido  Sapporo 
Tohoku  Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Akita, Yamagata, Fukushima, and 
Niigata 
Sendai 
Tokyo  Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo, Kanagawa, 
Yamanashi, and the eastern area of Shizuoka 
Tokyo 
Chubu  Nagano, Gifu, Aichi, Mie, and the western and central areas 
of Shizuoka 
Nagoya 
Hokuriku  Toyama, Ishikawa, and Fukui  Toyama 
Kansai  Shiga, Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo, Nara, and Wakayama  Osaka 
Chugoku  Tottori, Shimane, Okayama, Hiroshima, and Yamaguchi  Hiroshima 
Shikoku  Tokushima, Kagawa, Ehime, and Kochi  Takamatsu 
Kyushu  Fukuoka, Saga, Nagasaki, Kumamoto, Oita, Miyazaki, and 
Kagoshima 
Fukuoka 
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Annex: Alternative Estimation 
B.1  Panel Data Estimation 
  In Table B.1, the results of the panel data estimation and some supplementary test 
statistics were added to Table 2 in the main text. Hausman’s specification test was conducted for 
the panel data model. Its statistics were  ) 3 (
2 χ = 2.4300 [.0488] and supported a random effects 
model. However, the F-statistics of the tests for the equality of parameters were found to be F (56, 
180) = 4.4233 [.000], and we rejected the null hypothesis of the equality of parameters in power 
demand functions among regions. That is, the results of the panel data estimation could not be 
accepted. 
  It should be noted that our model included a lagged dependent variable as an explanatory 
variable. Although this type of model required dynamic panel data estimation methods with 
special treatments and assumptions on fixed effects, time effects, data structure, etc., most of 
these factors are still insufficiently addressed. For example, the cross-section dimension has to be 
sufficiently large in order to ensure the consistency of estimates; however, it was actually limited 
to nine regions in Japan’s power industry. The estimation methods and test statistics related to 
our panel data estimation in Table B.1 were not seriously examined from these viewpoints in this 
alternative estimation. Serial correlations between error terms had to be examined carefully. 
Nevertheless, we paid little attention to this problem because Durbin’s h statistic for each regional 
power demand function did not indicate any problem. 
 Page 29 
[Table B.1 placed here] 
 
  Table B.2 shows the estimation results with an instrumental variable method for the 
Hausman specification test using instruments of one-period lagged explanatory variables, the 
number of users, gross regional products by sector (agriculture, manufacturing, and service), 
capacity of self-owned power plants, the ratio of their capacity to the total regional power demand, 
populations, number of households, and 6–13-period lagged dependent variables. (Our estimation 
results were found to be robust irrespective of the number of time periods of the lagged dependent 
variables.) 
 
[Table B.2 placed here] 
 
B.2  Alternative Specification 1: Sectoral Value Added Share Variables 
  Table B.3 shows the estimation results with an alternative specification of the demand 
function, where the share of the manufacturing and service sectors in gross regional products were 
included as additional explanatory variables. These new explanatory variables were not found to 
be significant at conventional significance levels; further, they had little impact on the estimates of 
other explanatory variables. 
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[Table B.3 placed here] 
 
B.3  Alternative Specification 2: Linear Demand Function 
  Table B.4 shows the estimation results with another alternative specification where we 
employed linear demand functions rather than log-linear ones. In comparison with the original 
estimation results in Table 2 in the main text, there were a few points to be mentioned. The 
coefficients of power charges were not significant in Chubu and Kansai, while those of the lagged 
dependent variable were not significant in Hokuriku and Kansai. Given this linear functional form, 
price elasticity was computed as  t i t i i Q p , , / ⋅ β  and was dependent on reference points, as shown 
in Table B.5. Price elasticity estimated with linear demand functions was found to be smaller than 
that estimated with log-linear functions. In contrast, our finding of relatively smaller elasticity in 
urban regions as compared to that in rural regions was robust even with this alternative 
specification. 
 
[Table B.4 placed here] 
[Table B.5 placed here] 
 
B.4 Alternative  Specification 3: HAC Covariance 
  Considering the possibility of a miss-specification of the model, we attempted another Page 31 
alternative estimation with the Newey-West (NW) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent (HAC) covariance estimator (Table B.6). The HAC estimates of covariance were found to 
be smaller than the original estimates by OLS. While these HAC covariance estimates made the 
originally insignificant coefficients of cooling degree days for Chugoku and Shikoku significant, 
our results regarding various statistical tests were not affected as a whole. 
[Table B.6 placed here] Page 32 
Table B.1:  Estimation Results by OLS and Panel Estimation Methods (Dependent Variable: Index of the Volume of Power Demand) 

























1.08981 –0.29650 0.37040 0.19822 0.00852 0.01361 –0.05291 0.46303 0.994 0.191 0.235 692.218  Hokkaido 
[.048] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.005] [.832] [.003] [.000] [.849] [.814] [.000] 
0.15965 –0.26583 0.41314 0.15366 0.00907 0.13215 –0.04222 0.44448 0.996 –0.781 –0.959 939.488  Tohoku 
[.649] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.098] [.012] [.012] [.000] [.435] [.337] [.000] 
0.13118 –0.10503 0.39612 0.06903 0.04826 0.07053 –0.02488 0.44674 0.999 0.267 0.043 3,088.550  Tokyo 
[.447] [.003] [.000] [.005] [.000] [.005] [.021] [.000] [.790] [.966] [.000] 
0.75692 –0.15385 0.37949 0.07743 0.04649 0.05172 –0.02123 0.39633 0.996 –0.189 –0.671 1,055.600  Chubu 
[.021] [.005] [.000] [.022] [.002] [.068] [.183] [.001] [.850] [.502] [.000] 
1.64525 –0.25447 0.34335 0.07470 0.02512 0.10417 –0.03626 0.28431 0.986 –1.117 –1.166 268.256  Hokuriku 
[.003] [.000] [.000] [.025] [.012] [.028] [.051] [.020] [.264] [.244] [.000] 
0.64188 –0.10001 0.48696 0.11808 0.06296 0.04253 –0.03736 0.20813 0.996 –0.227 –0.502 871.471  Kansai 
[.008] [.041] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.048] [.004] [.089] [.820] [.616] [.000] 
0.95591 –0.26410 0.29245 0.16015 0.02364 0.06738 –0.05177 0.47152 0.985 –1.389 –1.337 252.005  Chugoku 
[.025] [.000] [.000] [.001] [.160] [.092] [.022] [.000] [.165] [.181] [.000] 
1.64683 –0.30033 0.33273 0.22593 0.03047 0.04951 –0.04421 0.26978 0.980 0.292 0.312 187.514  Shikoku 
[.003] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.117] [.266] [.038] [.056] [.770] [.755] [.000] 
0.68918 –0.22854 0.47181 0.13176 0.02583 0.04767 –0.04323 0.37057 0.996 0.402 0.132 982.948  Kyushu 
[.008] [.000] [.000] [.003] [.045] [.071] [.013] [.002] [.688] [.895] [.000] 
Panel 0.65385 –0.18351  0.17349 0.06977 0.01355 0.03886 –0.03694 0.72577 0.989 (Durbin-Watson)   
(random 
effects) 
[.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] (1.427)  
Note: P-values are shown in brackets. Page 33 
Table B.2:  Estimation Results by IV (Dependent Variable: Index of the Volume of Power Demand) 





























1.03454 –0.29543 0.36337 0.19296 0.00981 0.01863 –0.05230 0.47709 0.994 0.195 1.060 2.273  Hokkaido 
[.051] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.001] [.774] [.002] [.000] [.845] [.443] [.971] 
0.10788 –0.26014 0.40139 0.14833 0.00955 0.13450 –0.04340 0.46323 0.996 –0.587 1.247 1.141  Tohoku 
[.760] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.084] [.008] [.010] [.000] [.557] [.317] [.997] 
0.08026 –0.10208 0.38429 0.06748 0.05448 0.07064 –0.02541 0.46024 0.999 0.371 1.014 1.922  Tokyo 
[.662] [.001] [.000] [.003] [.000] [.003] [.015] [.000] [.710] [.480] [.983] 
0.76270 –0.16177 0.37763 0.08242 0.04600 0.05142 –0.02494 0.40103 0.996 0.218 1.172 1.843  Chubu 
[.028] [.002] [.000] [.013] [.001] [.152] [.162] [.000] [.828] [.364] [.985] 
1.69486 –0.26570 0.34950 0.08318 0.01883 0.10025 –0.04280 0.28384 0.985 –1.337 1.104 2.138  Hokuriku 
[.001] [.000] [.000] [.012] [.065] [.035] [.028] [.017] [.181] [.411] [.977] 
0.64269 –0.10263 0.47825 0.12154 0.06744 0.03631 –0.03596 0.21879 0.996 0.008 1.205 1.282  Kansai 
[.004] [.039] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.086] [.005] [.072] [.994] [.343] [.996] 
0.87045 –0.29580 0.30290 0.18546 0.02503 0.07401 –0.07232 0.47466 0.984 –1.744 0.833 4.425  Chugoku 
[.039] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.155] [.079] [.003] [.000] [.081] [.636] [.817] 
1.61493 –0.32236 0.32472 0.22665 0.02664 0.05155 –0.05510 0.30826 0.979 0.041 0.877 3.618  Shikoku 
[.004] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.163] [.321] [.012] [.033] [.967] [.596] [.890] 
0.59764 –0.22033 0.44810 0.11828 0.03216 0.05529 –0.04302 0.40073 0.996 0.320] 1.066 2.536  Kyushu 
[.015] [.000] [.000] [.004] [.014] [.037] [.008] [.000] [.749] [.439] [.960] 
Note: P-values are shown in brackets. Page 34 
Table B.3:  Estimation Results by OLS in Alternative Specification 1: Sectoral Value Added Share Variables 


































0.46684–0.28821 0.29638  2.00989 1.46057 0.164580.01026–0.03245 –0.02483 0.44389 0.995 –0.094 0.022  641.191  Hokkaido 
[.421] [.000] [.022]  [.132] [.313] [.007] [.001] [.657] [.200] [.000] [.925] [.982] [.000] 
–0.01571–0.24479 0.42290  0.21126–0.49361 0.162770.00857 0.14474 –0.02180 0.48124 0.996 –1.365 –1.458  768.025  Tohoku 
[.977] [.000] [.000]  [.815] [.619] [.000] [.167] [.007] [.267] [.000] [.172] [.145] [.000] 
–3.27292–0.13444 0.33251  3.84583 3.92380 0.053080.04866 0.07658 –0.02480 0.44482 0.999 0.065 –0.142  2,227.120  Tokyo 
[.493] [.018] [.004]  [.476] [.474] [.108] [.000] [.006] [.061] [.000] [.948] [.887] [.000] 
1.90558–0.12977 0.38808  –1.37916–1.65644 0.080320.04426 0.04634 –0.01509 0.45313 0.996 –0.300 –0.663  788.240  Chubu 
[.555] [.121] [.006]  [.723] [.677] [.043] [.004] [.153] [.400] [.001] [.764] [.507] [.000] 
–0.13652–0.23682 0.27030  2.22298 1.56362 0.048760.02996 0.12491 –0.00791 0.33128 0.988 –2.649 –2.783  242.825  Hokuriku 
[.922] [.001] [.012]  [.223] [.395] [.203] [.004] [.008] [.713] [.007] [.008] [.005] [.000] 
–7.00566–0.18276 0.37223  8.54279 8.15455 0.084520.06353 0.05990 –0.02322 0.28762 0.996 –0.775 –1.125  853.433  Kansai 
[.203] [.006] [.001]  [.167] [.187] [.012] [.000] [.008] [.076] [.018] [.438] [.261] [.000] 
–1.63258–0.29123 0.14427  3.49341 2.88735 0.130170.03941 0.08348 –0.03507 0.53266 0.986 –2.105 –2.223  211.168  Chugoku 
[.529] [.000] [.356]  [.331] [.413] [.024] [.046] [.041] [.131] [.000] [.035] [.026] [.000] 
0.61475–0.29823 0.24999  1.71798 1.19922 0.207200.03915 0.04324 –0.03159 0.30652 0.978 –0.270 –0.052  137.179  Shikoku 
[.696] [.000] [.164]  [.529] [.623] [.004] [.101] [.355] [.229] [.048] [.787] [.959] [.000] 
0.93286–0.22038 0.50895  –0.34145–1.02176 0.143570.02466 0.06168 –0.03024 0.41905 0.996 0.615 0.313  767.586  Kyushu 
[.538] [.001] [.010]  [.899] [.712] [.022] [.139] [.040] [.131] [.001] [.538] [.754] [.000] 
Note: P-values are shown in brackets. Page 35 
Table B.4:  Estimation Results by OLS in Alternative Specification 2: Linear Demand Function 
























16.71200 –0.21775 0.43686 0.11854 0.02664 0.00121 –2.83837 0.46998 0.994 0.532 0.570 661.953  Hokkaido 
[.021] [.000] [.000] [.001] [.004] [.587] [.049] [.000] [.594] [.569] [.000] 
8.96409 –0.19607 0.52013 0.10318 0.01350 0.00601 –1.89662 0.37873 0.997 –0.817 –0.8561,236.380  Tohoku 
[.035] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.003] [.010] [.121] [.000] [.414] [.392] [.000] 
2.82394 –0.04173 0.50163 0.04229 0.01417 0.00508 –2.16999 0.37440 0.999 –0.009 –0.1552,737.470  Tokyo 
[.236] [.079] [.000] [.006] [.000] [.017] [.015] [.000] [.993] [.877] [.000] 
14.51160 –0.05685 0.48793 0.03592 0.01314 0.00247 –2.49528 0.31797 0.996 0.196 –0.074 882.102  Chubu 
[.008] [.170] [.000] [.113] [.001] [.296] [.077] [.024] [.844] [.941] [.000] 
39.99010 –0.17717 0.44722 0.04820 0.01228 0.00426 –2.94464 0.18692 0.986 –0.180 –0.382 270.335  Hokuriku 
[.000] [.001] [.000] [.035] [.003] [.121] [.074] [.159] [.857] [.702] [.000] 
10.82290 –0.02005 0.52865 0.05663 0.01280 0.00342 –2.34962 0.23659 0.994 0.806 0.356 637.698  Kansai 
[.016] [.654] [.000] [.011] [.000] [.142] [.049] [.108] [.420] [.722] [.000] 
20.06100 –0.20086 0.36661 0.11064 0.01019 0.00661 –4.03346 0.41310 0.988 –1.798 –1.604 330.365  Chugoku 
[.002] [.000] [.000] [.001] [.014] [.037] [.022] [.000] [.072] [.109] [.000] 
33.64490 –0.24614 0.40342 0.15283 0.01022 0.00378 –2.67183 0.28090 0.984 1.169 1.011 236.148  Shikoku 
[.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.028] [.306] [.132] [.045] [.242] [.312] [.000] 
11.15590 –0.15038 0.53105 0.08131 0.00762 0.00397 –2.70278 0.36062 0.998 –0.422 –0.4541,556.450  Kyushu 
[.001] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.002] [.055] [.015] [.001] [.673] [.650] [.000] 
Note: P-values are shown in brackets. Page 36 
Table B.5:  Estimated Price Elasticity with Linear and Log-linear Demand Functions 
    Linear model  Log-linear model 




(α = 5%) 
Short run 0.199  –0.243  0.297  0.221–0.372 
Hokkaido 
Long run 0.376  –0.458  0.552  0.391–0.713 
Short run 0.182  –0.223  0.266  0.171–0.361 
Tohoku 
Long run 0.293  –0.359  0.479  0.353–0.604 
Short run 0.040  –0.049  0.105  0.042–0.168 
Tokyo 
Long run 0.064  –0.079  0.190  0.084–0.296 
Short run 0.055  –0.066  0.154  0.051–0.256 
Chubu 
Long run 0.081  –0.096  0.255  0.081–0.428 
Short run 0.168  –0.190  0.254  0.139–0.369 
Hokuriku 
Long run 0.207  –0.234  0.356  0.210–0.501 
Short run 0.020  –0.022  0.100  0.005–0.195 
Kansai 
Long run 0.026  –0.029  0.126  –0.002–0.255 
Short run 0.188  –0.221  0.264  0.161–0.367 
Chugoku 
Long run 0.321  –0.376  0.500  0.322–0.678 
Short run 0.226  –0.263  0.300  0.194–0.407 
Shikoku 
Long run 0.315  –0.365  0.411  0.237–0.586 
Short run 0.140  –0.170  0.229  0.135–0.322 
Kyushu 
Long run 0.219  –0.266  0.363  0.227–0.500 
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Table B.6:  Estimation Results by NW in Alternative Specification 3: HAC Covariance 
















Adjusted R2 Durbin’s h
1.08981 –0.29650 0.37040 0.19822 0.00852 0.01361 –0.05291 0.46303 0.994 0.326
[.013] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.799] [.000] [.000] [.744] Hokkaido 
(.048) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.005) (.832) (.003) (.000)
0.15965 –0.26583 0.41314 0.15366 0.00907 0.13215 –0.04222 0.44448 0.996 –0.541
[.574] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.041] [.001] [.001] [.000] [.589] Tohoku 
(.649) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.098) (.012) (.012) (.000)
0.13118 –0.10503 0.39612 0.06903 0.04826 0.07053 –0.02488 0.44674 0.999 0.416
[.362] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.003] [.000] [.678] Tokyo 
(.447) (.003) (.000) (.005) (.000) (.005) (.021) (.000)
0.75692 –0.15385 0.37949 0.07743 0.04649 0.05172 –0.02123 0.39633 0.996 0.243
[.003] [.000] [.000] [.003] [.000] [.022] [.101] [.000] [.808] Chubu 
(.021) (.005) (.000) (.022) (.002) (.068) (.183) (.001)
1.64525 –0.25447 0.34335 0.07470 0.02512 0.10417 –0.03626 0.28431 0.986 –0.883
[.000] [.000] [.000] [.003] [.001] [.005] [.011] [.002] [.377] Hokuriku 
(.003) (.000) (.000) (.025) (.012) (.028) (.051) (.020)
0.64188 –0.10001 0.48696 0.11808 0.06296 0.04253 –0.03736 0.20813 0.996 –0.144
[.000] [.009] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.013] [.000] [.034] [.886] Kansai 
(.008) (.041) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.048) (.004) (.089)
0.95591 –0.26410 0.29245 0.16015 0.02364 0.06738 –0.05177 0.47152 0.985 –1.107
[.003] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.087] [.039] [.002] [.000] [.268] Chugoku 
(.025) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.160) (.092) (.022) (.000)
1.64683 –0.30033 0.33273 0.22593 0.03047 0.04951 –0.04421 0.26978 0.980 0.389
[.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.052] [.175] [.009] [.017] [.697] Shikoku 
(.003) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.117) (.266) (.038) (.056)
0.68918 –0.22854 0.47181 0.13176 0.02583 0.04767 –0.04323 0.37057 0.996 0.454
[.001] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.011] [.024] [.001] [.000] [.650] Kyushu 
(.008) (.000) (.000) (.003) (.045) (.071) (.013) (.002)
Note: P-values for the estimation results by NW are shown in brackets, and P-values for those by OLS (in Table 2) are shown in parentheses. 